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Incentives for seeking protection in  the  steel industry-
particularly  import  quotas  as a fixed  proportion  of  domestic  sales
- seem  to increase  with  industry  concentration.  If protection  is
necessary,  tariffs are preferable  to import  quotas.
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This  paper-  aproductofthe Intemational  Trade  Division,  Intemational  Economics  Department-  is  part
ofalargereffort in thedepartmentto  analyze  the  effects  oftrade distortions  ondeveloping  countries.  Copies
of the paper  are available  free from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please
contact  Sarah Lipscomb,  room S7-062,  extension  33718 (March 1993,  31 pages).
In considering  whether  to privatize  a large state-  The lesson  for policymakers  - who should
owned  steel enterprise  in Argentina,  the question  -be trying to minimize  economic  distortions  - is
arose:  Would  its sale to a consortium  of large  that if protection  is necessary,  tariffs  are
domestic  enterprises,  and the resulting  increase  preferable  to import  quotas, perhaps  even to the
in firm concentration,  inevitably  lead to cries for  point of making  quota-type  restrictions
protection?  unconstitutional.
To shed light on the question,  Qian and  The simulation  results  for Argentina  confirm
Duncan examine  data for steel industries  in the  that the less substitutable  domestic  and foreign
major industrial  countries.  They also construct  a  goods  are, the higher  the rents the domestic
simulation  of Argentina's  steel sector  to study  industry  can extract.  So, it is important  for
the relationships  between  levels of industrial  policymakers  implementing  privatization
concentration,  substitutability  between  domestic  schemes  to ease any explicit  or implicit obstacles
and imported  steels,  trade policy  regimes,  and  to imports  by such  measures  as:
matk-ups  of domestic  prices  over international
prices.  * Standardizing  domestic  product
classifications  wih intemational  classifications.
Their simulation  results show that heavier
rents and economic  distortions  are generated  * Modemizing  transportation  facilities  to
through ixed-ratio import  quotas (quotas  that are  improve  the speed of shipment  and
a fixed  proportion  of domestic  sales) than  communication.
through use of a tariff or a fixed-quantity  import
quota.  * Reducing  bureaucratic  practices  related  to
trade in goods  and services.
The results  show why industries  seeking
protection  prefer a fixed-ratio  import restraint-  * Releasing  foreign  exchange  restrictions.
a practice  being  used increasingly  often  in
industrial  countries.  If there is not perfect  The goal should be to make a foreign
substitutability  between  domestic  and imported  transaction  as easy as a domestic  transaction.
steels,  the incentives  for the Argentine  industry
to seek protection  - particularly  as a fixed-ratio
quota-  are greater,  the more  concentrated  the
industry is.
I  ThePolicyResearchWorking  Produ  ssebynte  Policy  Research  isseminderway  iCntheBar  Anobjectiveoftheseries
is to get these  findings  out  quilc4dy,  even if presenttations  are less than  fiflly  polished.  The findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not  necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
Prodused  by  the Policy  Reseach Dissemination  CenterPxivatization, Concentration, and Pressure
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I. Introduction'
1.  This  paper presents what are  essentially preliminary results from a  study of  the
relationships  between  industry  concentration,  domestic  price mark-up, and the potential  demand
for trade protection  in a steel sector.  The study was initiated by the World Bank's interest in
the privatization  of Argentina's  steel sector, 2 where it was proposed that a major publicly  owned
steel company, SOMISA, be sold to a domestic  consortium  formed by the two largest private
steel producers.  Such a purchase would have'  led to the consortium  holding 85% of the steel
market in Argentina. The question  posed was: if the industry  became more concentrated,  would
there be a predisposition  to greater trade protection,  particularly  non-tariff-barriers  (NTBs)  such
as quotas, voluntary export restraints (VERs), and anti-dumping actions against other steel
producers?'
tThe authors wish to thank Messrs. W. Martin, B. J. Choe, and P. Varangis who advised
us on the model-specification,  Messrs. P. Meo and A. Kapur who encouraged  and directed the
study, and all participants  at the paper's review meeting in the LAC region.
2"A Sector Report on the Steel Industry Rationalization  and Strategic Privatization  Options
for Sociedad  Siderurgia  Argentina (SOMISA)', The World Bank, LA4TF, 1991.
3SOMISA  (80% of its capital) was sold in November, 1992 to an international  consortium
led by an Argentine steel and engineering  group Techint, and renamed Aceros Parana.  The
manner in which the company  was sold prohibited  the two largest national steel companies  from
combining  to purchase it.  The other consortium  members  include the Chilean  steel group CAP,
Brazil's largest steel maker  Usiminas,  and Brazil's state-owned  iron ore producer CVRD.  The
remainder of SOMISA (a ship-plate  mill and some office buildings) is still for sale.  Techint
owns one of the two private integrated steel mills in Argentina (Siderca).  The other private
integrated  steel mill, Acindar, was not successful  in its bid for SOMISA.2
2.  The answer to the above question has important implications  to ongoing privatization
operations in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  Privatization  is driven by the
belief that ownership is a significant  determinant of enterprise performance.  Evidence shows
that, regardless  of the country, good performance  from state-owned-enterprises  (SOEs)  has been
very difficult  to sustain. However, questions  have  been raised about the high degree of industry
concentration  that may result from the sale of SOEs to the private sector.  Some believe there
is no need for any concern over this issue because  an open trade account would  be sufficient  to
prevent rents accruing to oligopolistic  industries.  However, if higher industry concentration
means higher industry protection, an open trade account  itself will be in doubt.
3.  It is obvious that higher concentration would make it easier for industry to extract
oligopoly/monopoly  rents and result in domestic  prices higher than international  levels.  How
much a higher level of concentration  would  raise domestic  prices and how different  trade policy
measures (e.g., tariffs, quotas) would affect an industry's ability to increase prices at different
concentration  levels are much less obvious. If the level of concentration  affects an industry's
ability to extract rents through protection, there is most likely an association  between the level
of concentrat;on  ard the type of protection  adopted -- as different types of protection generate
different levels of rents.
4.  The next section presents empirical evidence on industry concentration, domestic steel
price mark-ups, and trade protection schemes in the G5 countries (France, Germany, Japan,
United  Kingdom  and United States). The section following  develops  a model  which features an3
oligopolistic  domestic  market  and  imperfect  substitution  between  domestic  products  and imports,
and discusses  simulation  results  on the relationship  between  concentration  rates and domestic
price mark-ups  under  different  trade  policies.4
II. Empirical  Evidence
5.  Steel  production  and  steel  price  data  were  obtained  from  the  World  Steel  Dynamics  group
of PaineWebber. 4 These  include  time-series  data  (1972  to 1989)  on domestic  steel  prices  of the
G5 countries,  international  prices  (Antwerp  spot,  and  export  prices  of Germany  and Japan),  and
production  statistics  of the major  steel  companies  in each of the G5 countries. This data set
allows  calculation  of the percentage  deviations  of domestic  prices  from  international  prices  and
the construction  of Herfindahl-Hirschman  indices  (HHI) of induery concentration  for each
country. By cross-plotting  the percentage  price deviations  and the HHI, we have  a weak  test
of the hypotheses  of how concentration  relates  to price mark-up,  and how  concentra*;on  relates
to trade  protection.
6.  Figure  1 shows  such  a plot for  the United  States  for  hot rolled  sheet. The  horizontal  axis
depicts  the HHI,  and the  vertical  axis  represents  the percentage  price  deviation.  Each  "+ " sign
corresponds  to a particular  year.  The straight  line is the best-fitting  line through  the yearly
observations. It can be seen that in the United  States:  (i) there is no trend in steel industry
concentration;  (ii) there is a positive relationship  between the Herfindahl  index and the
percentage  price deviations  (the estimate  of the slope  coefficient  is 10.8, indicating  that, on
average,  one  percentage  point  increase  in the Herfindahl  index  would  increase  the  price  deviation
4"International  Steel Pricing  - Core Report  00o,  Paine Webber,  World Steel  Dynamics,
1991.5
by more than 10%); (iii) it may not be by coincidence  that most observations  above the
regression  .ie are the years when VERs were ii' place (i.e.,  1969-74  and 1983-89),  and
observatio&rs  below  the line are years  when  VERs  were not in effect  (i.e., 1975-82).
Figure 1:  Concentration  and Price (USA)
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7.  Figure  2 gives the same  plot for France.  Unlike  the case for the United States,  the
Herfindahl  index  for France  varies  greatly  from about  20% to well above  90% because  of the
merger  of two  major  steel  producers,  Usinor  and Sacilor,  in 1987.  This  gives  us the  opportunity
to observe  what  happens  when  there  is a sudden  change  in the concentration  index. The  results
confirm  the conventional  wisdom:  domestic  prices  in 1987  and 1988  exceeded  the international6
price by more than 40%, and in 1989  by more  than 25%.  The slope oefficient  estimate  is
0.27, indicating  that on average  a 10%  percent  increase  in the Herfindahl  index  would  see an
increase  in mark-up  of the domestic  price over the international  price of about  3%.
I  Figure  2:  Concentration  and Price  (France)
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8.  For other countries  (i.e., Germany,  Japan and the UK), no easily  observable  positive
relationships  can be seen between  the Herfindahl  index and domestic  prices.  In Figure 3,
selected  yearly  observations  for the combined  data  set of the G5 countries  (i.e., 1973,  1975,
1978,  1980,  1982, 1985, 1988)  are plotted. The country  abbreviation  and year are presented
on top of each  observation. Unlike  the cases  of the United  States  and France,  the best fitting7
straight  line in Figure 3 is almost  flat; the slope  estimates  is 0.02, meaning  that for a 50%
increase  in the Herfindahi  index,  the domestic  price deviation  would  increase  by a mere 1  %.
Figure  3:  Concentration  and Price (G5)
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9.  The lack  of success  in finding  a consistent  positive  relationship  across  countries  between
the Herfindahl  index and the domestic  price deviation  is perhaps  because  of the complicated
nature  in which  domestic  price is determined  not only by industry  concentration  but also by an
ar;ay uf other variables  such as income  growth, elasticity  of substitution  between  domestic
products  and imports,  prices  of inputs  in the steel  production  process,  interest  rates, exchange
rates,  technological  changes,  and  political  economy  considerations.  Given  that  all these  variables8
also  have  influence,  it is difficult  within  a simple  model  to single  out  how  industry  concentration
determines  domestic  steel  prices  and trade  policies. In order to do that, we need  to specify  a
more  complex  model  to control  for all other  possible  relationships.  But such  a model  requires
a greater  range  of data than  are available  at present.
10.  In light of the difficulties  of taking  an econometric  approach,  it was decided  to use a
simulation  model  where  some  exogenous  variations  can be ignored  by assuming  that they  are
constant  and some  others  can  be controlled  in the simulation  process. The simulation  model  is
described  in the following  section.9
m. Simulation  Model and Results
11.  The simulation  model contains five equations as listed in Table 1.  It combines the
features of: (i) an oligopolistic  domestic  market with a fixed number of firms of identical size
(i.e., no one has more market  power than  another) which  are playing  Nash-in-quantity  (Cournot)
games, 5 and (ii) imperfect substitution  between domestic  products and imports.  The first step
in model building makes the link between the concentration  measure (Herfindahl Index) and
market competitiveness. The second step of the exercise is to set up a Constant Elasticity of
Substitution  (CES)  demand  framework  for domestic  products  and imports. A detailed  derivation
of the model is included in Annex I.  The basic behavioral  characteristic of the model is that
when there is imperfect  substitutability  between imports  and domestic  production,  or when there
is protection  against  imports, the higher the industry  concentration  the higher  the domestic  mark-
up.
12.  Equation (M.3) is the key equation  which simulates  the domestic  price p, for each level
of the Herfmdahl index, under given assumptions (e.g.,  elasticity of substitution and trade
policies). We apply actual values taken from Argentina's steel sector to see what could happen
to the domestic steel price if the industry concentration,  as reflected  by the Herfindahl index
were changed from one level to another. By comparing  solutions  across different  trade policies,
5Each firm sets its production level believing that this will not affect the output of other
firms.10
we can answer  the question  as to what kind of trade protection  scheme  is most  appealing  to
oligopolistic  steel  producers. In addition,  we can solve  for consumption  levels  of xl and x2,
calculate  average  cost  and profitability,  and determine  the optimal  size  of the steel  industry  (this
may  be done later after  data are available).
13.  The model  is used  to simulate  three trade  policy  scenarios.  In the tariff-based  scenario
the four unknowns  are Pl, P2, xl, and x2, while  h, m, e, r and  p are given. In the fixed-ratio
quota  scenario,  r becomes  unknown,  but the ratio  of  xj/x 2is known. In the  fixed-quantity  quota
scenario,  x2 is known. The scaling  factor  A and two technical  coefficients  of the CES  model,
a, and a2, need  to be calibrated  from observations  of p, x,, x2, pl, and p2 of a benchmark  year.
14.  Tables  2 and 3 present  the simulation  results. 6 The year 1991  is used  as the benchmark
year -- a year when there were no non-tariff  barriers in Argentina  and the tariff (7) for general
carbon  steel imports  was about 25%. The hot-rolled  sheet  price is used  as the representative
price for  steel.  In  the domestic market, prices were as  follows: p,  = $440/ton and
p2=$468.75/ton  (because  of the tariff).  The international  price (p) was $375/ton,  and the
marginal  cost (m) is assumed  to be the same  as p.  Consumption  of domestic  steel  (xl) was
1,691  thousand  tons and imports  totaled  306 thousand  tons -- both measured  in crude steel
equivalent  terms.  The price and income  elasticities  of aggregate  steel demand  (e and i) are
assumed  to be -0.6 and 1, respectively.
6Results  are presented  in levels  in Table  2, and  in percentage  changes  (calculated  as the log
differences)  in Table  3.11
Table 1: The model structure
x=Ax 1,x 2)
1  (M.1)
=(a,xp  4aA)  4  P
x=ApY'  (M.2)
-M=  hpj(l-P)(P 1 P2)
Pj  m-  P2+CP 1(p-1)  (M3)
p-I~  ~~~~~I3
where  P 1=pPla  a2 -1 ,  P2=P2P  a, 1
x1 - py-  (M.4)
x2 (aip 2)
P2=('+.C)P'  W-.
Variable  Unit  Description
X 1:  ('000 tons)  consumption  of domestic  steel
X 2:  ('000 tons)  consumption  of imported steel
x:  ('000 tons)  total steel consumption  (domestic  and imported)
e:  price elasticity  of total steel consumption
Y:  total income of domestic consumers
i:  income elasticity of steel consumption
pi:  ($/ton)  domestic  price of domestic steel
P2:  ($/ton)  domestic  price of imported steel
p0:  ($/ton)  intemational  price of steel
m:  ($/ton)  marginal cost of steel producers
T:  (%)  tariff or implied  tariff rate
h:  (%)  Herfindahl-Hirschman  Index
A:  scaling factor
a,:  technical  coefficient  of CES model (i  = 1,2)
p:  technical coefficient  of CES model, related to elasticity of
substitution  a, where a  =  l/(p-l)12
15.  The three trade policy  scenarios  are as follows. The first (tariff=25%)  relates  to the
actual  situation  where there are no non-tariff  barriers  and a simple  tariff  is set at 25%.  The
second  assumes  a fixed-quantity  import  quota  of 306,000  tons  (the volume  of steel  imports  in
1991). The  third  scenario  assumes  a fixed-ratio  import  quota  where  the share  of imports  is fixed
at roi'ahly  19%  of total  consumption  (using  the actual  1991  value). Two  values  are selected  for
the elasticity  of substitution  between  Jomestic  steel  and  imports  (a=-3.33 and oa=-6.67)  for  each
of the three trade policy  scenarios. 7 In addition  to solving  for Pl, P2,  xl, x2 and x, the model
also solves  for r as the implied  tariff  rate for trade  policy  scenarios  when  import  quota  systems
are in place. Variable  p is the composite  price  of domestic  steel  and imports  (see  Annex  I), and
it represents  the average  cost  of steel  consumption  (including  both  domestic  and imported  steel).
16.  The simulation  model was run through  the complete  range of the Herfindahl  index
between  the values  0 and 1 for each  combined  set of assumptions  (six blocks  as shown  in Table
2). The  responses  of prices  and quantities  are shown  in continuous  form  in graphs  in Annex  II.
In Table 2, three snap shots  at possible  values  af the Herfindahl  index  before  and after the
suggested  merger  in Argentina  are presented.  We  had  to make  rough  estimates  of the index  due
to the lack  of detailed  production  data  for the major  integrated  steel  mills  in Argentina.  At the
time there were four integrated  steel  producers. After  privatizing  SOMISA,  the state-owned
company,  there  would  be three. If the buyer  of SOMISA  were to be the consortium  formed  by
7A simple  calculation  based  on yearly  changes  of real prices  and quantities  of imports  and
domestic  consumption  of steel in Argentina  during  the 1971-85  period  gives an elasticity  of
substitution  equal  to -3.63. If the model  specification  is reasonable  and the  Herfindahl  index  was
indeed  25% in 1991  (the benchmark  year), and given the initial  conditions  set for the other
model  parameters  (for 1991),  the elasticity  of substitution  would  be in the range  -3.33  to -6.67.13
the  two private  steel plants, it  is  likely that the  steel industry would have been further
concentrated. Thus, we felt that the number  of integrated  steel  producers could  be changed from
four to three and possibly to two.  Assuming  that all the remaining  major integrated producers
are roughly equal in size, and the non-integrated  steel mills (8-9 of them) are negligible  in the
Herfindahl  index calculation,  the HHI value would  be 25% before the privatization  process, and
33% or 50% afterwards.
17.  As expected, all six blocks in Table 2 show that as the HHI increases, domestic  price
(Pl) also increases.  However, the degree of the increase  in (p,), and hence the domestic price
mark-up, varies greatly depending on the assumptions. When the tariff rate is 25% and the
elasticity  of substitution  (a) is -3.33, the increase  in concentration  from four firms to three would
raise pi  by 6.6% ($473.87 to $506.19), and increase the aggregate steel price index (p) by
5.1%.  At the same time, total steel consumption  would decline  by 3% - demand for domestic
steel falls 8.3% and import  demand  increases  by 13.7%. Further concentration  from three firms
to two increases the market distortion.  The price for domestic steel increases by a further
12.8% ($506.19 to $575.33), the aggregate  steel  price index  rises a further  9.3%, and aggregate
steel consumption declines a further 5.6%.  If the elasticity of substitution  (or)  is doubled to -
6.67, while keeping the tariff rate at 25%, the domestic market distortion brought about by
concentration  of the industry is much less severe than is the case when o=-3.33.  When the
number of the firms changes from four to three, pA  increases by only 3.3%, p increases by
2.6%, and total steel consumption declines 1.6%.  If steel available to be imported is more
substitutable  for the domestically-produced  steel  product, the industry  concentration  becomes  less14
powerful in terms of the ability to extract oligopoly  rents. The substitutability  between domestic
steel and imported steel may be improved by easing any explicit and implicit obstacles to steel
imports such as: (i) standardizing  domestic  product classifications  with intemational ones; (ii)
modernizing transportation facilities to reduce shipping backlogs; (iii) reducing bureaucratic
practices related to trade; and (iv) relaxing foreign exchange restrictions.
18.  Historically, steel industries worldwide have exhibited preferences for  quantitative
restrictions on imports over the use of simple  tariffs. Figure 1 seems to confirm why this is so,
at least for the United States. We simulated  two different forms of import  quotas for Argentina
in order to assess the incentive  for pressure for the imposition  of quotas from Argentina's steel,
industry given an increase in concentration.
19.  When a fixed-quantity  import quota is in effect and the elasticity of substitution  (a) is -
3.33, the change from four firms to three increases  p 1 by 8.8% ($480.43 to $524.39).  This is
not much higher than the simple tariff case, where p, increased by 6.6%.  The aggregate  steel
price index (p) rises by  8.4%, because imports are fixed, and the price of imported steel
increases  by 6.9%.  Consequently,  total consumption  of steel declines  by 5%.  The implied  tariff
is 44% for the same level of imports as for the simple  tariff of 25%.  If the number of firms is
reduced from three to two, the market distortion  would  become  a lot worse. Domestic  price (pA)
increases by a  further 20%,  and aggregate price increases by  a further 19%.  Total steel
consumption  declines  a further 11.5%.  Similar to the tariff case, if the elasticity of substitution
is increased to -6.67, the market distortions  become less severe.  When the number of firms is15
reduced from four to  three, prices, PI and p,  would only increase by 5.1%  and  5.0%,
respectively, and the implied tariff becomes 30%.
20.  In many of the existing VER schemes the quotas are set as a fixed percentage of total
domestic consumption, rather than as  fixed volumes.  Fixed-ratio import quotas have the
advantage  over fixed-quantity  import  quotas from the domestic  producers' point of view because
imports can also be forced to contract when the market is weak. Thus, we simulated  the effect
of industry concentration  under a fixed-ratio  import quota system.  It turns out to be the worst
scenario of the three in terms of market distortions. In the case of or=-3.33 and the number of
firms declining  from four to three, both p, and p increase 9.6% and total consumption  declines
5.8%.  The implied tariff rate jumps from 37% to 51%.  If the number of firms changes from
three to two, Pi and p increase by a further 24.2%, total consumption  falls by a further 14.5%
and the implied tariff jumps to 92%.  As in the other two scenarios, the higher value of the
elasticity  of substitution  softens substantially  the negative impact  of industry  concentration. In
fact, the simulation  results are very similar to the fixed-quantity  import quota scenario.  The
only notable difference  is that the quantity  of imports is less because it is forced to decline.16
Table 2: Simulation  results on concentration  ratios and trade policies (in levels)
Tariff=25%
o=-3.33  I  o=-6.67
HHI  25%  33%  50%  I  25%  33%  50%
Pi  473.87  506.19  575.33  I  438.13  452.89  479.85
P2 468.75  468.75  468.75  I  468.75  468.75  468.75
p  472.76  497.32  545.66  I  444.64  456.56  476.88
xI  1271.93  1170.31  972.00  I  1394.67  1315.14  1165.23
x2  360.27  413.03  525.63  I  299.85  352.70  459.59
x  1632.20  1583.34  1497.62  I  1694.52  1667.84  1624.82
Fixed-QuaL.tity  Import  Quota x2=306.31
or=-3.30,I  o=-6.67
HIE  25%  33,e  50%  |  25%  33%  50%
pi  480.43  524.39  640.94  I  437.33  460.14  513.90
P2  502.36  538.14  629.57  I  466.21  487.84  538.32
p  484.87  527.24  638.44  I  443.53  466.17  519.38
X 1 1301.30  1222.49  1056.65  I  1390.76  1340.81  1237.38
X2  306.31  306.31  306.31  j  306.31  306.31  306.31
x  1607.61  1528.80  1362.96  I  1697.07  1647.12  1543.69
Ir  34%  44%  68%  I  24%  30%  44%
Fixed-Ratio  Inport  Quota  x2 /x=19%
or=-3.33  I  o=-6.67
HIE  25%  33%  50%  j  25%  33%  50%
pi  482.68  531.52  677.10  j  437.18  461.68  524.09
P2  514.22  566.24  721.34  465.75  491.85  558.33
p  488.90  538.37  685.83  I  443.33  468.17  531.45
xI  1309.88  1236.28  1069.14  I  1390.04  1345.30  1246.76
x2  289.76  273.48  236.50  I  307.49  297.59  275.80
x  1599.64  1509.75  1305.64  A  i697.53  1642.90  1522.56
7  37%  51%  92%  |  24%  31%  49%17
Table 3: Simulation  results on concentration  ratios and trade policies (in % changes)
Tariff=25%
o=-3.33  o=-6.67
HllH  25%  33%  50%  I  25%  33%  50%
pi  . 6.6%  12.8%  . 3.3%  5.8%
P2  0.0%  0.0%  I  . 0.0%  0.0%
p  . 5.1%  9.3%  I  . 2.6%  4.4%
Xi  . -8.3%  -18.6%  I  . -5.9%  -12.1%
x2  *  13.7%  24.1%  I  . 16.2%  26.5%
x  . -3.0%  -5.6%  I  -1.6%  -2.6%
Fixed-Quantity  Import Quota x2=306.31
a=-3.33  !  o=-6.67
mHI  25%  33%  50%  I  25%  33%  50%
pi  . 8.8%  20.1%  j  . 5.1%  11.1%
P2  . 6.9%  15.7%  j  . 4.5%  9.8%
p  . 8.4%  19.1%  !  . 5.0%  10.8%
xI  . -6.2%  -14.6%  I  . -3.7%  -8.0%
X2  *  U0.0%  0.0%  I  . 0.0%  0.0%
x  . -5.0%  -11.5%  . -3.0%  -6.5%
7  . 24.6%  44.5%  I  . 21.4%  37.1%
Fixed-Ratio  Import Quota x2/x- 19%
o=-3.33  I  o--6.67
EHIl  25%  33%  50%  i  25%  33%  50%
Pi  . 9.6%  24.2%  I  . 5.5%  12.7%
P2  *  9.6%  24.2%  I  . 5.5%  12.7%
p  . 9.6%  24.2%  I  . 5.5%  12.7%
xI  . -5.8%  -14.5%  . -3.3%  -7.6%
x2  *  -5.8%  -14.5%  I  . -3.3%  -7.6%
x  . -5.8%  -14.5%  I  . -3.3%  -7.6%
7  . 31.8%  59.4%  . 25.4%  44.9%18
IV. Conclusions
21.  The analysis of data from steel industries in the G5 countries can neither confurm  nor
reject the hypothesis that increased industry concentration leads to  greater domestic price
distortions. Data from US and French steel industries  seem to support the hypothesis,  but data
from German, Japanese, and UK industries  give ambiguous  results.  No doubt the evolvement
of trade policies and domestic marketing  organizations  can be very complex, and without an
elaborate econometric  model it is difficult to properly test the hypothesis.
22.  Therefore, a simulation  model  was constructed,  based on the behavioral  assumption  that
an oligopolistic  industry will take advantage of higher concentration, under circumstances  of
imperfect substitution between imports and domestic products, to  increase mark-ups over
inernational  prices.  The results from the  simulation show how the extent of  the price
differential  depends  on the degree  of market  segregation  between  domestic  products  and imports.
Trade protection schemes  and the elasticity  of substitution  between  domestic  and imported steel
are two major determinants of the degree of market segregation.  Simulations  confirm that
higher substitution  elasticities  mean  lower  domestic  price distortions, and that quantitative  import
restrictions  protect domestic  steel producers more than simple tariffs. Fixed-ratio  import  quota
generate much larger rents for domestic  industries  than a tariff or a fixed-quantity  import quota.
These results show why industries seeking  protection  through the restriction of imports prefer
to have  import quotas  which  are a fixed-rtio of domestic  consumption. Given  that the data used19
in the model  are reasonably  representative  of the Argentine  steel  industry,  the incentive  for the
industry  to seek  protection,  particularly  in the form  of quotas,  seems  to be large.
23.  The results  depend  critically  on the assumption  of imperfect  substitutability  between
imports  and domestic  products. If substitution  possibilities  are great,  as some  believe,  then  the
industry's  ability  to extract  rents  is zero  in the absence  of import  restrictions  or low if there is
protection  -- regardless  of the degree  of concentration. Thus, estimating  the elasticity  of
substitution  is an important  area for empirical  work.  The Cournot assumption  is another
important  area for research  as the results  from the simulation  model  are determined  in part by
the assumption  about the price-setting  behavior  of firms.  As regards  other areas for further
work, it will be useful to address the question  of economies  of scale, as the gains from
economies  of scale  with  fewer  firms  can  offset  losses  due to higher  concentration.  It would  also
be desirable  to endogenous  the trade  policy  setting  behavior  within  the model.20
Annex I. Construction of the Simulation  Model
1.  The model  combines  features  of: (i) an oligopolistic  domestic  ma:cet with a fixed  number
of identical  firms (i.e,, no one has more market power  tian another) where the firms are playing
Nash-in-quantity  (Cournot)  gamnes,  and (ii) imperfect  substitution  between  domestic  products  and
imports.
2.  The first step makes the link between the concentration  measure (Herfindahl  Index) and
market competitiveness. The set up of the model  is the following. Each of the n firms produces
q!=q 1
1 +q2,  where q,i is its domestic shipments  and q2 is exports, and lie  marginal cost is m.
Total  production  of the industry  is q=q1+q2, where q, is total domestic  shipments  and qC  is total
exports.  Total domestic consumption  is x=f(xl,x2), where x, =qt and x2 is imports.  There is
a  single domestic price p,  and a  single intemational price p.  The international market is
assumed to be perfectly competitive,  thus p'=m.  Domestic consumers  face P2 as the price for
their imports, where P2 mav be greater than p  due to trade protection measures. The inverse
market demand function for domestic  product is assumed  to be pi=p(xl,  x2, P2, Z), where Z is
a vector of other variables.  For firm i which produces q', its profit is:
:  =plqi-mqi  (A.1)21
The first-order  condition  (for ql') is:
?27l+p  q 1-m=O  (A.2)
which  can be re-written  as Lemer's measure  as:
Op 15
plm  aq,  P  l  l  (A.3)
P 1 P 1 &1P 1 ql  e1
where  sli is the share  of the domestic  shipment  of the i'  firm in total domestic  shipments,  and
e, is the demand  elasticity  for domestic  product. Expression  (A.3) holds  for each firm, so the
weighted  average  price-cost  margin  for the industry  equals:
>lpl  =_M=_  h  (A.4)
5.0  Pi  L-o  el
where  h is the Herfindahl-Hirschman  index  based  on each  firm's domestic  shipments.  Since  pi
and m are identical  across  all firms,  and the sum  of all shares  equals  one, the expression  (A.4)
can  be re-written  as:
pI-m  h  (A.5
pi  el
Since  el  <0, expression  (A.5)  says  that  higher  industry  concentration  results  in higher  domestic
price over the marginal  cost.
3.  From the industry  profit expression  i=ppql-mql, we can write down the first order22
condition  (for ql) based  on the so-called  effective  (or perceived)  marginal  revenue  expression:
d-q  i +1dql-!,=  (A.6)
where  X  determines  the market  competitiveness.  If there  is a monopoly,  X=1, expression  (A.6)
would  represent  the usual  monopolistic  behavior. If the firms  in the industry  act like price
takers, then X=O  and (A.6) coincides  with the condition  uf perfect  competition.  Substituting
(A.5) into (A.6) and solving  for X:
h
I  = - ^  = h Pl 841  = h el =h  (A.7)
Optq  el q, 1 o  e
Thus,  the Herfindahl-Hirschman  index  h determines  the market  competitiveness.
4.  In order to simulate  the effect of industry  concentration  on the domestic  price using
expression  (A.6),  we  need  to explicitly  specify  (6pll/qj). The  next step  of the exercise  is to set
up the CES (Constant  Elasticity  of Substitution)  demand  framework  for domestic  products  and
imports. Following  Armington 8, total  domestic  consumption  x can be specified  as:
X=Ax)  1  (A.8)
=(axi +a2A)P
where  a, and a 2 are technical  parameters,  and o=(l/(p-1))  is the elasticity  of substitution.  The
8Armington,  P., "A  Theory  of Demand  for Products  Distinguished  by Place  of Production",
IMF  Staff  Papers,  Vol. XVI (1969),  pp. 159-78.23
corresponding  total  cost  of consuming  quantity  x thus  is:
I  p  I  P p1
c=(al  p 1¶1 +a 2 "p 2i  1)  P x  (A.9)
=p(p1jP2)X
where p(p,p2) can be considered  as the aggregate  price index by imposing  the restriction
ajI+a2 =  =l,  Assuming  the demand  function  for total domestic  consumption  x is in the Cobb-
Douglas  form:
x=ApGYI  (A.10)
where e is the price elasticity  of demand,  i is the income  elasticity  of demand,  and A is the
scaling  factor. From Shepherd's  lemma,  the demands  for xl and x2are:
Xi  3c =  +  XP  OPX  X= P x(l +C)  (A.11)
ap 1 8p 1 x  ap  1 @
X2 =  =-Lx+  -- x -tx=-  1  e+C)  (A.12)
7P 2 aP 2 X P  P2 aP 224
Thus the derivative of x, with respect to Pi is:
.-ac  a O
"1X  1 41+e)  Opt  X+ BP  I
ap0t  0,01  a  ,  (  8P  a0p  (A.13)
=(1+e) -tX+  -I-'s
Since q,  =x,  by substituting  (A. II) for x, and (A.  13) for (8pilac4), we can re-write (A.6) as:
pi-m  =-h-(1  +C)r 
IPx  [3  a2  (A.14)
'1+L+(9)2E]
Expression (A.  14) would be simplified  to the following:
hpl(1  -p)(P1 +P2)
P2+eP 1(p -1)
.-  1  ."^=eP1(p-l)  ~~~(A.15)
P-  P1  1
where  P 1=p,P af 1 ,  P2=p 2P  a1P
The ratio of x, over X2 can be derived from (A. II) and (A.  12) as:
x1 i  1  (A.16)
X2  a1P2 )
Finally, P2  is linked to intemational  price p:
P2=(e  i+s)p  (A.qre
where r  is the tariff or the tariff equivalent  if quantitative  restraints are in place.25
5.  The simulation  model  includes  four equations,  (A.  10), (A.  15), (A.  16), and (A.  17). In
the tariff-based  scenario  the four vnklmowns  are Pi, p2,  xl, and x2, while  h, m, e, r and p are
given. In the quota-based  scenarios,  T is unknown,  but we would  either know  x2 for the case
of the fixed-quantity  import  quota,  or we  know  the ratio  of xl/x 2 for the case of the fixed-ratio
import  quota. Three  unknown  parameters,  a, a, and  a2, need  to be calibrated  from observations
of p, xI,  x2, PI, and p2 of a benchmark  year using  expressions  (A.  10), (A.  16)  and the identity
aj`+a%v=  1.
6.  Once the solution  for Pi is obtained,  we can compare  it with the average  cost of a
"typical"  steel  producer  and calculate  the optimal  size of the country's  steel  industry.26
Annex  II. Graphical  Presentation  of Simulation  Results/a
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FIgure  4: Simple  Tariff Scenario  [tariff=25%,  elasticity  of substitution=-3.33J
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